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NATURE AND SPIRIT 
IN HEGEL’S ANTHROPOLOGY 
SOME IDEALIST THEMES 
IN HEGEL’S PRAGMATISM 
Iain Macdonald 
Département de philosophie 
Université de Montréal 
RÉSUMÉ : Certaines lectures récentes de Hegel ont mis l’accent sur la dimension sociale de la phi-
losophie de Hegel afin de parer les exagérations et les méprises courantes concernant son idéa-
lisme. Robert Brandom, par exemple, a relevé des « thèmes pragmatistes dans l’idéalisme de 
Hegel ». Mais une question d’ordre général se pose : cette stratégie déflationniste rend-elle réel-
lement justice à la pensée de Hegel ? Qu’advient-il des conditions logiques requises pour la con-
naissance et l’action, auxquelles Hegel attache beaucoup d’importance, et comment ces condi-
tions cadrent-elles avec les dimensions naturelles et sociales de l’expérience ? En tablant sur 
des passages de l’Encyclopédie et d’autres textes, le présent article argumente en faveur d’un 
transcendantalisme modeste chez Hegel, afin d’éviter la rectification exagérée qui consiste à 
réduire le concept du concept chez Hegel à un réseau de pratiques sociales. 
ABSTRACT : Some recent readings of Hegel have stressed the social dimension of Hegel’s philoso-
phy in order to ward off common exaggerations and misconceptions about his idealism. Robert 
Brandom, for example, has pointed to “pragmatist themes in Hegel’s idealism.” But a general 
question arises as to whether this deflationary strategy really does justice to Hegel’s thought : 
what becomes of the logical preconditions for knowledge and agency, on which Hegel places 
much emphasis, and how exactly do these preconditions mesh with the natural and social di-
mensions of experience ? On the basis of passages in the Encyclopedia and other texts, this 
paper argues for a modest transcendentalism in Hegel, in order to avoid the over-correction 
that consists in reducing Hegel’s concept of the concept to a network of social practices. 
______________________  
he question running through this study is not uncontroversial : is Hegel a tran-
scendental philosopher ? Or more specifically, the question is : what kind of tran-
scendental philosopher is he ? Of course, Hegel’s critique of traditional (i.e., Kantian) 
transcendental philosophy is well known and for most people it goes without saying 
that he sees the Kantian approach as a valiant but ultimately failed effort. But the 
question becomes more pressing in the contemporary critical context, in which it has 
become common to stress what Terry Pinkard rightly calls “the sociality of reason” or 




forms of social practice.”1 Now, although this is clearly Hegel’s view, the idea merits 
further clarification, especially in relation to Hegel’s frequent critiques of the contin-
gency and one-sidedness (Einseitigkeit) of historical subjectivity. Or to put it the 
other way around, for Hegel the sociality of reason has to be understood according to 
its necessity, which means in relation to spirit understood as the “absolute founda-
tion”2 or the “absolute prius.”3 In effect, this is the central tension in Hegel’s thought : 
how to think, at the same time, spirit as an absolute condition of possibility and the 
absolute necessity of inevitably contingent manifestations of spirit. 
But it is difficult to strike the right balance between necessity and contingency 
while remaining true to the language of transcendental philosophy, which regards the 
contingent and the empirical as necessary but as essentially separate from the pure 
original unity of apperception. This is the simple answer to why Hegel distances him-
self from this language : it is too abstractly oppositional. But there may be good rea-
son to revisit the problem, especially in view of some recent literature on Hegel that 
goes too far in the other direction (i.e., in the anti-transcendental direction), by seek-
ing to reduce or dismiss the tension between spirit qua absolute and spirit in nature 
and history. The result is a revisionism that is gaining in popularity. In this vein, 
Robert Brandom has sought to push the sociality of reason to an extreme by reducing 
Hegel’s philosophy to a discourse on the social practices by which meaning is con-
stituted. This position, which is one of conceptual pragmatism, is first of all based on 
making a distinction between objective inferential relations (entailment and incom-
patibility) and subjective inferential processes (historical, social belief formation and 
error correction). This distinction has its merits, but the more problematic conse-
quence of conceptual pragmatism is that it undialectically evacuates the transcen-
dental question (or what the transcendental question, equally undialectically, is trying 
to grasp) too quickly and thereby invalidates its appropriation of Hegel’s philosophy. 
Brandom asks the following question : “Can we really understand relations of in-
compatibility without any prior grip on what is incompatible ?”4 His answer to this 
question is “no,” of course, based on the claim that material inferential relations can 
only be grasped in and through their corresponding practices.5 In other words, rela-
tions of inferential incompatibility necessarily presuppose the real-time processes and 
practices in which they are borne out.6 This ultimately leads Brandom to the claim 
                                       
 1. Terry PINKARD, Hegel’s Phenomenology. The Sociality of Reason, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
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that “for Hegel all transcendental constitution is social institution.”7 What Brandom 
seems to mean is that knowledge and agency are shaped by social practices, such as 
negotiation and administration ; moreover, such practices are the only way in which 
we can determine conceptual content ; therefore, such social practices exhaust the 
determination of conceptual content. On this view, there is no absolute first — there 
is only the a posteriori priority of the social. In other words, on Brandom’s view, 
which he attributes to Hegel, knowledge and agency are purely social achievements ; 
they do not rest on any non-social or a priori condition of possibility. 
The problem with such an approach, as temptingly deflationary as it may seem, is 
that it tends to dismiss or attack the absolute priority Hegel clearly accords to logical 
relations and the internal structure of the Concept (i.e., the concept of the concept), 
emphasizing only the lived reality of spirit, the aspect that Hegel calls externalization, 
Entäusserung, or “spirit emptied out into time.”8 At the very least, before we opt for a 
pragmatist reading, we should clarify the kind of priority that Hegel accords to the 
Concept in view of his commitment to the lived reality of spirit in conflict with itself, 
engaged in the social processes of belief formation and error correction. For this ten-
sion is essential to Hegel’s thought ; to the extent that readers of Hegel ignore or dis-
miss it, they are pursuing lines of thought incompatible with Hegel’s. 
In the present context, the well-trodden path of looking at the constitution of liv-
ing spirit through the social struggle for recognition will be avoided, mainly because 
the struggle for recognition presupposes a subjectivity that is already receptive to al-
terity and competing knowledge claims. For this reason, the struggle for recognition 
cannot be understood in isolation, without knowing how spirit pre-forms the subject’s 
demand for recognition in the social context. But what is the nature of this presup-
posed subjectivity ? Are social practices primary ? Or is spirit in some other sense 
primary ? Or to put it another way, what does Hegel mean when he says, in the Ency-
clopaedia, that “actual spirit […] has external nature for its proximate presupposition 
and the logical idea for its first presupposition”9 (der wirkliche Geist […] hat die äu-
ßere Natur zu seiner nächsten, wie die logische Idee zu seiner ersten Vorausset-
zung) ? Hegel’s anthropology provides us with answers to these questions. To antici-
pate somewhat : in natural spirit — in sensibility (Empfindung) and the feeling soul 
(die fühlende Seele) — we discover the logical preconditions for knowledge and 
agency, as well as the natural preconditions for social practices such as concrete er-
ror-correction. Moreover, because these preconditions are seen as necessary and uni-
versal presuppositions, it is also through Hegel’s anthropology that we can shed some 
light on Hegel’s ‘strange’ transcendentalism. 
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However, before moving on to a discussion of these issues, it may help to recall as-
pects of Hegel’s critique of Kant’s transcendentalism, just as a way of clearing up some 
potential sources of confusion. The fact of the matter is that Hegel consistently avoids 
using most of the language of transcendental philosophy ; and indeed, he never charac-
terizes his own thought as transcendental. There are several reasons for this, the most 
obvious of which is that the term is bound up with the inconsistencies of Kant’s phi-
losophical system. One of the pillars of Hegel’s critique of Kant is thus that his 
thought “does not correspond in its development to its beginning,”10 by which Hegel 
means that Kant’s argument for synthetic a priori judgements betrays the true insight 
that underpins his theoretical philosophy in the first place : that there must be an 
original a priori synthesis containing within itself both identity and difference. The 
betrayal of this insight, on the other hand, consists in the fact that Kant falls into a 
discourse that abstractly opposes what is synthesized to the synthesizing forms them-
selves : intuitions and concepts may be mutually necessary for there to be knowledge, 
but they are nevertheless fundamentally distinct. Hegel will take issue with this first 
of all by accusing Kant of making the concepts of the understanding a mere “psy-
chological reflex” ; or, in other words : the Kantian concept is “empty and devoid of 
content despite the fact that it is synthesis a priori.”11 His argument on this point is 
quite straightforward : if a priori synthesis is an absolute precondition of knowledge, 
then it can only be because synthesis always already contains “determinateness and 
difference within itself,” as opposed to meeting with difference only in the mani-
fold.12 Hegel criticizes Kant on a number of other issues, of course, but this is the one 
that is most central to his reception of the first Critique and his relation to the tran-
scendental : Kant’s a priori synthesis is far too formal. Not only that : it is also far 
too subjective, in that it denies that there could be any speculative unity of identity 
and difference (i.e., true synthesis) in the empirical counterpart to the Kantian tran-
scendental ego. Hegel, on the other hand, will undertake to show that there is a specu-
lative unity of identity and difference not only in subjective being, but also in objec-
tive being (at least in potentia), as well as in both taken together. 
Now, what is important here is the real substance of Hegel’s critique, which does 
not take aim at the transcendental as such, but rather at the one-sided, overly formal 
a priori that for Kant characterizes the original unity of apperception. Therefore, if 
Hegel refuses to use the word “transcendental” to characterize his own thought, it is 
not because he rejects the notion of original a priori synthesis. It is rather that the 
principle of original synthesis is misunderstood by Kant ; Hegel merely intends to 
rectify the misunderstanding. He wants to show that the speculative unity of identity 
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and difference necessarily implied by Kantian synthesis is not to be atomically con-
ceived in isolation from its empirical content. It would therefore be fair to say that he 
rejects only the Kantian idea of a purely subjective synthesis, rather than the more 
general idea of transcendental (i.e., universally and necessarily presupposed) synthe-
sis, though for Kant these are one and the same thing. Given all of this, it is under-
standable why Hegel avoids the term transcendental while still praising the original 
synthesis of apperception as “one of the most profound principles for speculative de-
velopment.”13 This remark suggests that we have to understand Hegel’s thought as re-
maining true to Kant’s original insight, namely that a unity of identity and difference 
is an absolute, a priori condition of experience and knowledge, “independent of its 
non-spiritual [i.e., natural], and also of its spiritual [i.e., historical], shapes.”14 
At first blush, this seems to be a baldly metaphysical claim, to the effect that the 
unity of identity and difference — namely, the Concept — is prior to its manifesta-
tions. Such claims are, of course, difficult for full-blooded pragmatists to reconcile 
with their insistence on the primacy of social practices. But the metaphysical appear-
ance of Hegel’s claim merits further examination, for he is in fact arguing for the 
sublation of any abstract opposition between transcendentalism and pragmatism. 
What is missing, though, is an understanding of the nature of the Concept, i.e., its 
natural character. 
It is an essential part of Hegel’s philosophy that the Concept “in its own absolute 
character […] constitutes a stage of nature as well as of spirit.”15 This first of all 
means that the absolute logical basis of experience and knowledge is, in spite of its 
absoluteness, also lived. Hegel is here putting forward the idea of a lived transcen-
dental — this is the paradox and the core of what needs to be understood in Hegel if 
we are not to err too far in the direction of purely social practices (the ‘lived’ taken in 
isolation), on the one-hand, or philosophical formalism (the ‘transcendental’ taken in 
isolation), on the other. The starting point, then, is life, or more specifically the life of 
spirit in nature ; for understanding how spirit is lived in nature will turn out to be 
necessary to understanding both how social practices are possible in the first place, 
and how ‘external’ nature already expresses the development of an original synthesis. 
As it happens, these are the fundamental aims of Hegel’s anthropology, which bridges 
the gap between the development of nature as such and the development of spirit as 
such, between the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit. 
It is important to recall that spirit is not an ‘entity’ of some kind. It is “something 
absolutely restless, pure activity, the negation or ideality of every fixed category of 
the understanding ; not abstractly simple but, in its simplicity, at the same time a dis-
tinguishing of itself from itself.”16 First of all, as pure activity, spirit asserts its inde-
pendence from existing historical, social practices ; but at the same time, as the basic 
act of distinguishing itself from itself, it necessarily involves a relative determinacy, 
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the concrete reality of distinction, which always happens in the specificity of a given 
time and a given place, and in the context of a network of given beliefs. Or to put the 
same idea in more concrete terms, spirit is the process whereby living subjects set 
themselves against objects (the subject as distinct from the object), while at the same 
time giving objects their due (the object as known by the subject). This process thereby 
requires a consciousness capable of bifurcation (Entzweyung) or redoubling (Ver-
dopplung), whereby difference can be experienced and overcome (e.g., contradictions 
between received wisdom and phenomenal knowledge, or the relation of ends to 
means). Properly understood, therefore, spirit is : (i) a difference immanent to spirit 
(because the difference between subject and object is construed by the subject), and 
(ii) the power to overcome this difference in the unity of spirit itself (because the 
subject can ‘make sense’ of the difference construed between subject and object). 
This may seem abstract, but the central claim is straightforward enough. Knowl-
edge, for it to count as knowledge, must be able to justify itself otherwise it would 
simply collapse. But then, at a minimum, knowledge requires a bifurcation of con-
sciousness, that is, a critical-comparative activity by which consciousness can con-
sider what it concretely takes to be the truth (the ‘in-itself’) in relation to possible 
defects in these so-called truths (the realization that the truth is always ‘for’ conscious-
ness or construed by the subject, i.e., ‘for-itself’). This activity is necessarily a prac-
tice, insofar as it requires the social and historical treatment of social and historical 
content for it to actualize itself. But it is also independent of this content when con-
sidered as the necessary structure of redoubled subjectivity, capable of experiencing 
and analyzing competing truth claims. This necessary structure or capacity is what 
Hegel calls being-for-self (Fürsichsein). 
Of course, being-for-self is not enough on its own, because as a critical-compara-
tive activity, spirit must not only be able to juxtapose its two moments (in-itself and 
for-itself) ; it must also be able to progress beyond specific tensions between these 
moments and thereby ‘produce’ itself. Concretely : knowledge must admit of possible 
progress in the form of error-correction, for otherwise it would simply lapse into 
dogmatism. This is what Hegel generically calls self-education and self-instruction 
(der Geist als sich bildend und erziehend betrachtet).17 We could also call this aspect 
the self-production of spirit. Taken together, being-for-self and self-production are 
the unity of identity and difference at work in the subject, the first moment of Hegel’s 
lived, transcendental condition of possibility of knowledge : ‘knowledge practices’ of 
whatever kind take and must take this form. 
However, the central problem has not yet been solved, for we do not have an an-
swer to how this is really possible or what the point is in insisting on it. Logically, 
knowledge and agency may require self-doubling and self-correction, i.e., being-for-
self and self-production. But the conceptual pragmatist can still reply that this is a 
mere abstraction from what really occurs. In the lived reality of belief formation and 
error correction, it is the practices and beliefs themselves that have primacy, since it 
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is in and through them that knowledge is really produced and errors are corrected. 
Logical relations alone do not constitute knowledge. Hegel’s reply to this is twofold. 
First, it makes no sense to give priority to social practices if we cannot account for 
their possibility, which means first of all their basis in natural existence. But, second, 
since the natural existence that makes such practices possible is essentially nothing 
other than the physical shape of self-producing being-for-self, the logical idea has an 
absolute (i.e., non-relative) priority. In other words, we see the same redoubled 
structure at work in natural existence as in spiritual existence. Thus, if the Concept 
“in its own absolute character […] constitutes a stage of nature as well as of spirit,” it 
is because it is the lived reality of a universal and necessary structure. For Hegel, it is 
in this way that knowledge and social practices presuppose natural spirit — in the 
form of a sentient, feeling body — which, in turn, is “inwardly bound”18 to spirit. 
Without such a body, informed by spirit, there could be no knowledge and no social 
practices. 
The key concept here is that of habit (Gewohnheit), which is based in sensibility 
(Empfindung) and the feeling soul (die fühlende Seele). But first a word about 
Hegel’s concept of soul : soul is equivalent here to natural spirit, the implicit unity of 
nature that nature itself cannot know or realize. On its own, as it were, nature is pure, 
undifferentiated externality and blind necessity, alien to ideality. But ideality is nev-
ertheless held within nature as its potential, as what nature can become through spirit. 
For example, the genus-species relation is only implicit in nature until spirit can draw 
it out and see it for what it is. In this light, the soul is just the “universal immateriality 
of nature, its simple ideal life.”19 Or as Hegel also puts it, soul is the “sleep of spirit”20 
or spirit in potentia. Thus it is somewhat one-sided to say that nature is simply or 
purely undifferentiated externality and, in fact, Hegel gives several examples of how 
matter sublates its own externality : gravity in this sense sublates the independence of 
the planets, just as the genus sublates the independence of the individual.21 But mak-
ing this sublation explicit of course requires spirit proper, the absolute power of ne-
gation. The production of spirit is therefore the “goal” (Ziel) of nature, according to 
Hegel, not in some mystical sense, but because spirit is a possibility contained within 
nature itself — a possibility that, once realized, allows nature to come full circle and 
know itself. However, nature must first “destroy itself and break through its husk of 
immediate, sensuous existence, to consume itself like the phoenix in order to come 
forth from this externality rejuvenated as spirit.”22 
It accomplishes this rebirth first in sensibility, which for Hegel is a primitive 
form of ideality. In sensibility, a very simple and limited phenomenon, there is really 
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only a “dull stirring”23 — but it is concentrated in a sentient soul who, as sentient, 
knows this stirring to be its own. Hegel already describes this as a negation and the 
expression of a constitutive universal because the sentient soul knows the sensation 
both as something independent from it (different) and as its own (identical). The 
given sensation is, as he says, “immersed in the soul’s universality and is thereby ne-
gated in its immediacy and so characterized as of ideal nature. Consequently, in this 
other, the sentient soul returns to itself, and in the immediate, merely given object 
which it senses, is at home with itself.”24 For example, the animal ‘knows’ how to 
distinguish edible from non-edible matter, it ‘reacts’ to its environment and defends 
‘itself’ against threats. In short, it relates itself to what it is not, and implicitly under-
stands this ‘not’. But this is nothing more than simple being-for-self, as previously 
defined. 
Interestingly, Hegel also calls this simple being-for-self “judgement” (Urteil), 
even though we are not at the level of language, in order to underscore the way in 
which the sentient soul already expresses a necessary logical relation, a middle term 
connecting mere existence to full-fledged being-for-self.25 Here then is the original 
synthetic a priori judgement, liberated from its formal and purely subjective shackles. 
More specifically, ideality, or soul, is described in these passages of the Encyclopae-
dia as the self-differentiating (sich teilende) soul asserting itself as a proto-self in the 
primordial judgement (Urteil) of sensation. In this primordial judgement (really an 
Ur-teil), mere existence looks upon itself as the unity of diverse sensations, and is for 
that reason the natural prototype of the ‘I’ that accompanies all its representations. Or 
in Hegelian terminology, mere existence is sublated in sensibility and thereby trans-
forms itself into incipient being-for-self. 
This picture is completed by Hegel at a later stage. In the section of his anthro-
pology dealing with habit, sentient being-for-self develops further into a soul capable 
of interaction with others and involved in a broader context of feelings and desires. In 
its least developed forms, the feeling soul can show itself to be in thrall to its own 
fancies (madness) or to the whims of another being (magnetism, or mesmerism). But 
in habit proper, the feeling soul becomes the master of its contingent sensations and 
desires. Corporeality in general is thereby subordinated to an abstract universal. For 
example, in becoming ‘used to’ (habituated to) the cold, the mere sensation of cold is 
suppressed in favour of an interested self-overcoming. At a more developed stage, 
feeling can be completely overshadowed by subjective aims, that is, by an abstract 
universal that realizes itself through or in spite of the mass of sensations and feelings 
that constantly course through the body. But more importantly, at this juncture, habit 
constitutes a turning point for natural spirit and the feeling soul : it marks the point at 
which the soul becomes “actual” (wirklich) and thus announces the advent of real 
consciousness, “the soul awaking [from its sleep in nature] to the higher stage of the 
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ego, or abstract universality.” 26  Thus although habit is focused on self-mastery 
through repetition, it is also the natural precursor to recollection and memory (Erin-
nerung and Gedächtnis).27 
In habit — that is, in making the functions of the body the functions of spirit — 
the soul transforms “its identity with its body into an identity posited or mediated by 
spirit”28 and mere contingent corporeity becomes inwardness. To put it simply, it be-
comes possible to interiorize (erinnern) contingencies, circumstances, and feelings to 
put them in the service of free ideality. I can shake hands, nod, turn up my nose, use 
my vocal cords to speak, etc. All of these examples signify through the subordination 
of physical to spiritual processes.29 In short, the body becomes a sign of something 
inward and unifying (a concept, an aim), in spite of persistent contingencies and con-
flicts in the feeling soul.30 But in making the body signify arbitrarily through habit 
(the habit, or convention, of nodding, of subordinating the hand to the pen, and so 
on), spirit is already expressing itself or, in short, producing itself. It has mastered the 
activity of opposing itself to itself, of learning how to realize its aims, and how to 
make contingent materiality serve ideality. But it has also learned how to overcome 
opposition (e.g., internal opposition : its own body ; or external opposition : magnetic 
phenomena) in order to achieve spiritual aims. Natural spirit has discovered (though 
it does not understood the consequences) that it can enact a universal principle, that it 
can produce at the level of habit the implicit truth of original synthesis, namely, an 
ideal subjectivity that remains self-identical in the repetitions that make up habit, as 
well as in the manifold gestures and feelings that make up its natural existence and 
which are moulded to its inwardness. As a complement to the incipient being-for-self 
of sensibility, therefore, we find here the self producing itself through self-overcom-
ing and training. In other words, we have discovered the natural origin of intellectual 
self-production and self-education. 
When Hegel says, therefore, that nature is the proximate presupposition of spirit, 
he means that nature (or more specifically, the “natural soul”) is the “real possibil-
ity”31 of the full-fledged being-for-self of the subject. The ‘I’ requires a nature of like 
kind (i.e., unified unity and diversity) to become what it is, namely, free, self-related 
universality. And when he adds that spirit is nevertheless the absolute prius, he means 
that nature ‘by itself’ cannot really count as anything, cannot even be seen as unified, 
as phenomenal, as something rather than nothing ; without spirit, understood as a 
possibility contained within nature, nature ‘by itself’ is only externality and blind ne-
cessity — nothing more. But given a natural consciousness who is able to posit a law 
of universal gravitation or for whom the animal is not a mere individual but part of a 
network of species and genera, this externality is overcome and nature loses its 
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strangeness to itself. Nature capitulates to spirit because spirit alone is capable of 
saying what nature is.32 It is in this sense that spirit has absolute priority over nature : 
it is the full unfolding of the unity implicit in nature’s external diversity — a unity 
made explicit only in the inwardness of recollection, which in turn is made possible 
only through natural processes that provide the real possibility for full-fledged spiri-
tual life. 
To return now to Hegel’s transcendentalism, a term which has been employed 
here contentiously : certainly, in the context of a philosophy that demonstrates how 
being-for-self and self-production are not the sole preserve of a subjective a priori 
form devoid of content, but rather manifest themselves in the very materiality that is 
traditionally opposed to it, it may be difficult to see why Hegel would want to main-
tain transcendental terminology. But on the other hand, Hegel’s anthropology shows 
us that on his view, the a priori goes all the way down, right into the first dawning of 
differentiation and the awakening of nature to itself in the sentient soul. This a priori 
is just as much objective and material as it is subjective and ideal ; only in this way 
can we fully account for the functioning of reason itself. But then, it seems quite mis-
guided to dismiss the talk of universal and necessary conditions of possibility, re-
placing them instead with social practices like negotiation and administration. Such 
practices are, on Hegel’s view, clearly necessary, but they do not tell the whole story. 
For they depend upon a natural body capable of mastering contingency in habit or, in 
other words, capable of subordinating its own desires to ideas or rational norms. But 
if it can do so, it is because this body is already rational, even in its most primitive 
organization of sensation. If Hegel is right in claiming this, then the most primitive 
social practice imaginable — habit formation — is already the generic expression of 
the dialectical unity of identity and difference. At the very least, then, some doubt has 
been cast on the tenability of readings of Hegel that give exclusive priority to social 
practices. Such practices presuppose a nature that can organize itself into an individ-
ual self, or that is always already a dialectical unity of identity and difference. Thus if 
it is true that “all transcendental constitution is social institution,”33 then it is no less 
true for Hegel that all social institution is transcendental constitution (i.e., dependent 
upon a universal and necessary synthesis). For, like every other abstract opposition 
treated in Hegel’s works, the tensions between transcendental and social modes of 
explanation cannot be reduced to one or the other of the terms in the opposition. They 
form a dialectical pair. They make sense only in their lived, mediated unity, as evi-
denced by natural forms of self-producing being-for-self. 
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